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Cri tiaue -Data in Search of Theorv
in Search of Policy:
Behavioral ~esponsesto
Videotape in the Courtroom
I

Gordon Bermant*
Do n o t trust data unsupported by theory1
This symposium marks a significant place in the history of the
relationship between behavioral scientists and jurists in their attempts
to understand the consequences of adopting the videotape medium
for use in trial presentations and recording. The early literature on
legal uses of videotape was concerned more with presenting the
medium's law-related potential and with generating enthusiasm for
the technology than with providing critical a n a l y ~ i s .Subsequent
~
reviews dealt with accumulated court experience with the medium
~
surprisingly
and outlined areas of social and legal ~ o n c e r n .Then,
rapidly, data appeared from experiments with, and systematic assessments of, juror responses to videotaped material.4 Thus in the 4
years since Judge McCrystal arranged the first prerecorded videotape
trial presentation (PRVTT),5 a reasonable body of legal and applied
scientific literature has developed. By bringing together the most
active participants on the behavioral science side of the issue, this
symposium serves the important function of providing the legal
community with a single source for review and analysis of the most
recent findings. And perhaps more importantly, the symposium's
articulation of both scientific and legal methods and concerns in the
area of videotape technology serves as a model for the treatment of

*Coordinator, Behavioral and Social Sciences, Battelle Memorial Institute; Affiliate
Professor of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
'Attributed to Lord Adrian.
2See, e.g., Morrill, Enter- The Video Tape Trial, 3 JOHNMARSHALL
J. PRAC.& PROC.
237 (1970).
3See, e.g., Doret, Trial by Videotape - Can Justice Be Seen to Be Done?, 47 TEMP.
L.Q. 228 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Doret]; Comment, Videotape Trials: Legal and
Practical Implications, 9 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROB.363 (1973); Comment, Video-Tape
Trials: A Practical Evaluation and a Legal Analysis, 26 STAN.L. REV.619 (1974).
*See, e.g., Bermant, Chappell, Crockett, Jacoubovitch & McGuire, Juror Response to
Prerecorded Videotape Trial Presentations i n California and Ohio, 26 HASTINGS
L.J.
975 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bermant] ; Bermant & Jacoubovitch, Fish Out of Water:
A Brief Overuiew of Social and Psychological Concerns about Videotaped Trials, 26
HASTINGS
L.J. 999 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bermant & Jacoubovitch] ; Miller, Bender,
SumFlorence & Nicholson, Real vs. Reel: What's the Verdict?, 24 J . COMMUNICATION,
mer 1974, at 99.
5McCall v. Clemens, No. 39,301 (C. P. Erie County, Ohio, Nov. 18, 1971).

468

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1975:

other issues in which the two perspectives need j ~ i n i n g . ~
Of course, scientists have a special obligation when they bring
their methods to bear on issues of such practical importance as the
operation of the courts. That obligation is to present their findings in
ways that allow nonspecialists to separate the substantive ore from
the methodological dross and establish priorities in regard to the
likely practical significance of the results reported. However, this
clarity must not be bought at the price of obscuring from view the
scientist's methods and forms of reasoning. The relationship between
results and conclusions must be clearly shown. The role of the critic
in this sort of symposium, therefore, is to provide a separate, clarifying opinion on the important relations among the methods, results,
and conclusions presented by the other participants.

I. IDENTIFYING
THE RELEVANT
ISSUES
Increased court-related use of videotape apparently offers a substantial number of potential benefits.' When evaluating the benefits
of videotape to the legal system, however, two classes of use must be
distinguished, with the benefits of each class measured against their
respective financial and social costs.
A. The Use of Videotape as the Official Court Record: Issues and
Problems
First is the use of videotape as the official court record. While in
principle many of the social and psychological issues associated with
videotape trial presentations also arise in the context of trial records,
in fact the problems are not so pressing because of the specialized
and sophisticated audience for these records: appellate court judges.
This is not to say that videotaped records provide no new problems,
but only that they are not the same as those presented when juries,
not judges, are the intended audience. As Short, Florence, and Marsh
6A recent example of the attempted joining of social science research and legal
analysis, and one in which some controversy has arisen, concerns the relative merits of
twelve- and six-person juries. T h e Supreme Court, in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970), and Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973), relied partially on several empirical
OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION,
A COMPARISON
OF SIX- AND
studies of jury size: INSTITUTE
TWELVE-MEMBER
JURIESIN NEWJERSEYSUPERIOR
AND COUNTY
COURTS
(1972); Bermant &
Coppock, Outcomes of Six- and Twelve-Member Jury Trials: An Analysis of 128 Cases
in the State of Washington, 48 WASH.L. REV. 593 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Berrnant
& Coppock]; Note, Six-Member and Twelve-Member Juries: An Empirical Study of
671 (1973); Note, An Empirical Study of SixTrial Results, 6 U . MICH. J.L. REFORM
and Twelve-Member Jury Decision-Making Processes, 6 U . MICH. J.L. REFORM712
(1973). T h e interpretations offered i n these studies, and the Court's reliance o n them,
have been criticized by Zeisel & Diamond, "Convincing Empirical Evidence" on the
Six Member Jury, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.281 (1974).
T h e debate was renewed i n a group of articles appearing in Trial. Thompson, Six
Will Do!, TRIAL,NovJDec. 1974, a t 12; Zeisel, Twelve Is Just, 10 TRIAL,NovJDec. 1974,
a t 13; and Saks, Ignorance of Science Is No Excuse, 10 TRIAL,NovJDec. 1974, at 18.
'McCrystal has listed 26 potential advantages of videotaped trials i n McCrystal,
Videotape Trials: Relief for Our Congested Courts, 49 DENVER
L.J. 463 (1973) [hereinafter cited as McCrystal] .
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~
is some concern that
point out in their symposium a r t i ~ l e ,there
appellate court review of video taped records will overextend the
appellate process. However, it seems reasonable to expect that official opposition to the use of video recordkeeping, based initially on
traditions against cameras in the court and decisions like Estes v.
T e ~ a s will
, ~ fade if it can be shown that the advantages outweigh the
increased costs to the system. Questions here seem primarily legal
and technical, not psychological or social.

B. Prerecorded Videotape Trial Presentations: Issues and Problems
The second major use of the medium is as a substitute for material
that would otherwise be presented in a different form during a traditional trial. Partial uses include reports of sobriety tests, confessions,
depositions, physical evidence, and so on. When the substitution is
complete, so that all testimony and, perhaps, even the opening and
closing arguments and judge's instructions are presented via videotape, then the triers of fact are faced with a complete prerecorded
videotape trial presentation (PRVTT). It should be remembered that
PRVTT is n o t the record of a live trial in a typical courtroom setting.
Many advantages of the prerecorded trial are due to the range of time
and place settings within which testimony can be taken. For
example, in the 14 prerecorded land-condemnation cases heard in
Judge McCrystal's court in 1974,1° the State of Ohio needed to
transport its appraisers from Columbus, the state capitol, to Sandusky, the trial site, only once, at which time their testimony on all
14 cases was taken. Had the trials been conducted live, they would
certainly have stretched out over a period of time that would have
required the appraisers to make many trips. And in Judge McCrystal's s e c o n d -PRVTT, Swain v. Norfolk & Western Ry.,ll
involving an industrial accident, the plaintiff's testimony was taken
on the accident site. Thus, for PRVTT and partial uses of the medium, there will generally be both spatial and temporal discontinuities
in the material presented to the triers of fact. The editorial discretions to be allowed in the out-of-court taping sessions and in the final
juxtapositions of separate testimonies constitute at least a theoretical
problem for the legal community, because, as Eisenstein proved by
example long ago, the juxtaposition of any two scenes on film produces a unique and sometimes unpredictable effect.12
8Short et al., An Assessment of Videotape in the Criminal Courts, section IV, A, supra
this issue [hereinafter cited as Short].
[Editor's note: Because of the time constraints imposed upon the publication of this
issue, references by Mr. Bermant to the other articles of this symposium are cited to
the appropriate section, part, and subpart of the articles and not to the number of the
page containing the relevant material.]
9381 U.S. 532 (1965).
1°The responses of the jurors to these PRVTT are reported in Bermant, supra note 4,
at 988-92.
llNo; 39,494 (C. P. Erie County, Ohio, Jan. 24,1973).
12Eisenstein asserted that "two film pieces of any kind, placed together, inwitably
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On the assumption that a jury is the intended audience for this
videotaped material, psychological concerns arise on three levels.
First, there are questions about the jurors' cognitive or intellectual
responsiveness to the medium: how much and how well can they
remember and sift through what is presented to them, and how does
this compare with their memories and analytic capabilities when the
same facts are presented to them in a live trial format? Second, there
are questions about the jurors' emotional responsiveness to the
medium: how does the presentation of legal material on videotape
affect the level and quality of emotional arousal, particularly when
compared with the effects of presenting the same material during a
live trial? Third, and most important, there are questions about the
jurors' legal accuracy in response t o the medium: do the combined
cognitive-emotional changes (if any) associated with the presentation
of videotape material lead to changes in the validity of the jurors'
judgments? As Doret put it in the title of his review of the videotape
issue, "Can justice be seen to be done?"l3
These three questions are easier to ask than to answer with certainty. This is not because the techniques currently available within
psychology are incapable of providing reliable measures of cognitive
or emotional responses under controlled laboratory conditions.
Rather, it is the existence of four deeper problems that makes the
"live v. videotape" question, intuitively simple as it may seem,
particularly thorny. The problems have to do with the logic of experimentation.

1. The video tape medium: measuring differences between modes
of presentation
The first problem involves the generality of comparisons. As discussed below in more detail, the research results so far available
suggest that juror behavior may be at least as responsive to differences in mode of presentation within the video medium as to some
live v. videotape comparisons. If this is true, then experiments that
attempt to establish a definitive "the same" or "different" verdict in
regard to the live v. videotape question are simply misguided, because, unless the particular video technique used in the experiment is
the only legally permissible one, changes in the video technique (such
as angles, lenses, switching ratings on views, and split-screen use) in
other experiments or actual applications could lead to the opposite
outcome. Put in somewhat more technical terms, the problem is to
locate the relevant sources of variance and manipulate them simultaneously over significant enough portions of their ranges to determine what the important interactions are. It would be naive to
imagine that one experiment, or one set of experiments, could establish definitive results for all the potential interactions among types of
combine into a new concept, a new quulity, arising out of that juxtaposition." S .
STEIN, THE
FILMSENSE4 (1942).
lSDoret, supra note 3.

EISEN-

46 71

BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO VIDEOTAPE

471

case material, characteristics of attorneys and witnesses, and characteristics of the medium of presentation.

2. The null hypothesis and the problem of establishing similarities
The second problem, related to the first, concerns the form of
quantitative reasoning reported in the symposium. The inferential
statistics employed by all three groups of investigators start with
the arbitrary assumption that there are no differences to be found
among the conditions being compared, for example, between videotape and live presentations. This assumption, known as the null
hypothesis, comes under statistical test when an observed difference
between the conditions is analyzed to determine the probability of a
difference of that size arising by chance alone. The statistical test
allows the investigator to arrive at a figure representing the probability that the null hypothesis is true. When that probability becomes acceptably small (typically, this means 5 or fewer chances in
100 that the observed difference occurred by chance), then the investigator rejects the null hypothesis and claims, with his confidence
level quantitatively established, that there is a nonrandom difference
between the conditions.
Clearly this form of quantitative reasoning is better suited for
establishing differences than for establishing identities. One can never
prove the null hypothesis, or the assumption of "no differences";
one can only establish the probability of its truth. Moreover, the null
hypothesis is not derived from a theory or prior set of observations.
I t is rather a logically and statistically convenient starting place for
comparative measurements and inductions about the likelihood that
two samples of observations were drawn from the same underlying
population. Hence, when the policy question is one of establishing a
condition of "no difference," as in the question "Is a videotaped trial
inferior in any legally significant way to a live trial?" these statistical
techniques cannot provide the kind of definitive answer that would
allow policymakers to act solely on the basis of the experimental
outcomes.
3. The absence of relevant theory
The third problem has to do with the roles of normative and
scientific theories in establishing conclusions relevant to policy. In
regard to the advent of videotape in the courts, we are faced with an
almost total lack of relevant theory at two levels. First, we have no
substantive theory with which to predict or understand changes in
legal decision making as a function of the medium of presentation.
Second, we have no normative theory t o inform us which among a
set of observed decisions is legally the most accurate or appropriate.
As a consequence of theoretical poverty, investigators are effectively
forced to go fishing for experimental outcomes in the sea of
legal, social, and psychological variables. And, because of the nature
of a fishing approach to research, the investigators will invariably
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find statistically significant differences. But unless we know both
how to evaluate these differences in terms of their impact on practical legal outcomes, and, given that evaluation, whether the status
quo ought to be changed in light of it, our experimental results just
flop around like strange fish on the bottom of the boat: we really
don't know if they are safe to eat. The symposium has landed a few
such fish.

4. The problem of determining levels of analysis
Fourth and finally, there is the problem of determining the various
levels of analysis at which the effects of videotape implementation
are to be sought and measured. We have argued elsewhere that apparently disadvantageous features of communication during a live
trial such as inadmissible testimony and unprofessional lawyer conduct may be advantageous in terms of the more general social
instructions or messages these features transmit.14 This is a debatable
matter. But there can be no doubt that full implementation of videotape (PRVTT) on a national basis would change the public's image of
courtroom justice. Arguments regarding the nature and desirability
of this change will revolve around concepts and values that transcend
technical and first-order psychological considerations about videotape; they will deal with the social significance of importing additional technology into currently "technology-free" settings like the
courts.15 However, this problem lies beyond the scope of the current
symposium and will not be further discussed.
Let us now pay attention more explicitly to three of the symposium
contributions. The studies conducted at Michigan State University
(the MSU study)16 and Brigham Young University (the BYU study)17
need to be analyzed in parallel because of the partial overlapping of
their methods and concerns. The study conducted by Ernest H.
Short & Associates (the California study)18 is sufficiently different to
be treated separately; it will be discussed first.

The California study is divided into five sections, of which the
third, "Psychological and Behavioral Impacts of Videotape," and the
fifth, "Recommendations and Conclusions," will be of primary
concern here. There are, however, two parts of the study's second
W e e Bermant & Jacoubovitch,supra note 4.
l5See generally THEAMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION
AND THE AMERICAN
INSTITUTEOF
COURTHOUSE
-PLANNINGAND DESIGNFOR THE JUDICIAL
ARCHITECTS,
THEAMERICAN
PROCESS
(1973).
16Miller et al., The Eflects of Videotape Testimony in Jury Trials: Studies on Juror
Decision Making, Information Retention, and Emotional Arousal, supra this issue
[hereinaftercited as Miller].
17Williams et al., Juror Perceptions of Trial Testimony as a Function of the Method
of Presentation: A Comparison of Live, Color Video, Black-and-White Video, Audio,
and Transcript Presentations, supra this issue [hereinaftercited as Williams].
18Short,supra note 8.
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section that warrant comment. In the discussion of picture composition the authors recommend the use of zooms t o close-up; justification for the recommendation is in terms of technical need, that is, to
provide a more detailed view of a participant than the basic establishing perspective can provide. What is not discussed, however, is the
extent to which the close-up view should be carried.lg That such a
guideline is required is suggested by research results from our laboratory indicating that facial close-ups significantly alter the impressions
formed by obser~ers.~o
The California study makes a similar argument for split-screen technique in the discussion of special effects,
and indeed, the justification for the use of this special effect is sensible. However, it is worthwhile to note that in the collection of
results reported by the Michigan State group, one apparent exception
to the generally null outcomes was the difference between splitscreen and full-screen presentations on ratings of attorney credibili t ~ . Although
~l
this difference was only marginally reliable and is
difficult to interpret in any case, the fact remains that even such
cautious recommendations as those in the California paper may lead
to unique sets of juror responses. This comment is not a criticism of
the recommendation; it is rather an illustration of the point, made
above, that without a prior commitment to what is desirable in juror
responsiveness, rational decisions ab.out techniques of various sorts
are difficult to make. Thus, given the assumption that a certain
videotape technique such as split-screen enhances estimates of attorney credibility, does one argue for split-screen on the basis that
attorney credibility is a social desideratum or against it on the basis
that jurors should be encouraged to develop a healthy scepticism of
the advocates on both sides of the issue?
The primary behavior focus of the California study is on the responses of participants to the videotaping of approximately 75 preliminary hearings. Presumably, although it is nowhere stated in the
paper, approximately one-half of the hearings were conducted under
conditions of videotape recording. A total of 100 witnesses, 44 attorneys, and 14 judges were either interviewed or observed. The concern
in the study is with the possible disruption of proper courtroom
demeanor and responsiveness produced by videotape recording. The
data deal only with the recording of preliminary hearings; however,
the authors' assumption that their findings are generalizable to other
in-court recording applications seems plausible. Unfortunately, no
data are reported o n juror responsiveness to recording or playback.
%uch a guideline is provided in the generally excellent manual Guidelines for PreRecording Testimony on Videotape Prior to Trial, prepared by the Federal Judicial
Center in November 1974 and available from the Federal Judicial Center, Washington,
D.C. 20234. There is a good deal of intuitive psychology in the prescription on page
22 that " [wlhen focusing on a witness to cover his verbal testimony, the operator
should always maintain the witness' face in the picture, and should never go in closer
than the entire face."
20The research results are reported in a manuscript by Jacoubovitch, Bermant &
Crockett currently in preparation.
21Millersection 11, c, 3, b.
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Hence, the behavioral aspect of the study is primarily relevant to
questions about videotape as a trial record and secondarily relevant
to questions about videotape as a substitute for live trial presentations. The purely technical recommendations and cost estimates
should be equally useful for both classes of videotape applications.
It is not possible to provide a detailed critique of the methods
employed in the study because the authors do not supply the details.
The repeated references to the use of analysis of variance techniques
are particularly interesting given the heavy reliance on verbal reports
that needed to be coded and placed in an acceptable metric before
the analysis could be carried out. It would be of value to other
investigators in the field if the California group would provide a
detailed description of its coding procedures and the particular forms
of variance analysis used.
The study does provide one example of the form in which judges
and attorneys were asked to comment on witness conduct during
videotaping sessions. The jurists were virtually unanimous in their
disagreement with the assertion that "[w] itnesses are unresponsive
to questioning when being videotaped." Taken on its own, the unanimity is uninformative because the form of the question effectively
biases the outcome. Only perceptions of substantial video-induced
witness taciturnity could lead one to agree with the assertion as
worded. The authors report that these responses are supportive of
self-report and observational measures. One would have liked the
opportunity to assess the data generated by these other measures in
more detail.
Although the scientific reader is left uneasy by the lack of relevant
detail reported in the study, there seems little serious reason to
doubt the fundamental conclusion that the addition of videotape
recording equipment (as specified) to the setting of a pretrial hearing
had little if any lasting behavioral impact on the principal participants. The study is overwhelmingly negative in regard to the finding
of differences. If the assumption be valid that the pretrial hearing is a
suitable model of a full trial, then the same conclusion would hold
for trials. However, two cautionary points should be made. First, as
the authors emphasize, the study does not report on the conduct of
court principals after they have had the opportunity to view themselves on videotape playback. The self-confrontational aspect of
exposure to the medium may have a measureable effect on the behavior of lawyers and j ~ d g e s . ~While
2
this may be of more psychological than legal interest, it is a factor that should be investigated
longitudinally, for it may provide insight into one of videotape's
long-range consequences.
Second, conclusions about the minimal behavioral impact of the
videotape recording procedure in pretrial hearings do not necessarily
22For an overview of the effectiveness of videotape as a self-confrontational medium,
VIDEOTAPE
TECHNIQUES
I N PSYCHIATRIC
TRAINING
AND TREATMENT
(1970).
see M. BERGER,
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generalize to out-of-court settings. However, it seems plausible at this
stage of our understanding to conjecture that the behavioral demand
characteristics23 of most legal settings are sufficiently intense and
explicit that the addition of unobtrusive videotape recording equipment to them will not have large behavioral consequences for the
participants.
The conclusions and directions for future research suggested by
the California group are well chosen. But it is also important to
emphasize that increased court-related videotape use will, inevitably,
lead to variations in local practice that may produce abuses of the
medium to the detriment of certain parties. For example, a source of
potential abuse is the method by which pretrial videotaped materials
are financed. One of our early concerns about prerecorded testimony
was that it might differentially benefit those best able to pay the
recording costs." Cost-benefit analysis as practiced in the California
study is from the perspective of the state. The significance of these
figures is not the same in criminal and civil settings. The emphasis on
criminal courts in the California study should not cause the reader to
overlook the reality that the bulk of prerecorded trial experience has
been and may well continue to be in civil settings. Research and
analysis should be conducted to determine the fairest means of financing videotape use for the sorts of civil cases that currently produce the largest trial backlogs. Just rules f or video tape cost-bearing
combined with sound, strict technical guidelines for videotape use,
such as those proposed by the Federal Judicial Center,25willgo a long
way to prevent abuse of the medium.

In contrast to the California study, the MSU and BYU studies deal
with the influence of various forms and features of videotaped testimony on juror decision making. Both studies attack the "live v.
videotape" question head-on and come up with generally similar results but different conclusions. Thus the MSU group ends up with a
generally sanguine attitude about the widespread introduction of
PRVTT: "There exist no strong grounds for arguing that videotape
will exercise a negative impact on juror decision making."26 The
BYU group, on the other hand, argues for a more conservative policy
23A behavioral demand characteristic is a feature of experimental or other social
setting that tends to control the forms of behavior in that setting, independent of other
presumably controlling factors. See Ome, On the Social Pyschology of the Psychological
Experiment: With Particular Reference to Demand Characteristics and their Implica776 (1962).
tions, 17 AM.PSYCH.
24Bermant, Chappell & McGuire, Videotaped Trials: Advantages and Disadvantages,
June 1973 (unpublished paper presented at the First National Symposium on Crime and
the Media, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York City, N.Y.).
2 5 F JUDICIAL
~ ~ CENTER,
~ ~ GUDELINES
~ ~ FOR PRE-RECORDING
TESTIMONY
ON VIDEOTAPE
PRIOR
TO TRIAL(1974).
26Millersection V.
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position. They are more concerned than the MSU group about the
validity of current experimental procedures, and they would like to
see more research done before implementation becomes widespread:
"These and other findings of differences between live and media
trials should stand as a caution to those proposing the immediate and
widespread implementation of videotape trials."27 The critique of
these studies will include discussions of features that separate them
as well as those they hold in common. It begins with some general
comments that apply to both studies.
A. Features Common t o Both Studies
1. Decision making: juror v. jury
First it must be emphasized that all the results reported in these
studies refer to decisions by individual jurors (or mock jurors), not
decisions by juries. Neither MSU nor BYU has investigated the impact of videotape presentations on the group decision-making process
of juries. As a practical matter, the decision not to study the group
process might be defensible on grounds of financial and temporal
economy. Many more data can be collected in a given period of time
with a given number of dollars if the experiments are terminated
without actual jury formation and group discussion. But these are
true economies only if the results obtained from individuals are
predictive of the results that would have been obtained from groups.
Put more technically, we need to be sure that there is not a significant interaction between the unit of decision making (individual v.
group) and the medium of presentation (live v. videotape) before we
can be confident that the differences (or lack of them) reported to
arise in individual judgments as a function of the medium adequately
predict the results for group judgments. What are the grounds, if any,
for having this confidence? Neither the MSU nor the BYU group
brings any evidence to bear on the issue. The MSU group announces
its interest in the individual rather than the group and is careful to
talk only about jurors and never about juries. The BYU group does
not deal explicitly with the issue but mentions in a footnote28 a
result by Kalven to the effect that the verdicts of individual jurors on
their first ballots is highly predictive of the eventual group decision.
While this result is partially relevant, it does not get at the question
of interaction directly.
On the other side of the issue are arrayed numerous results from
experimental analysis of individual and group decision making.29 For
example, there is a large literature dealing with systematic shifts in
decision outcome from the average of a set of individual decisions to
the consensus decision made by a group composed of those individ2Williams section IV, B.
28Williamsn.67.
PSYCHOLOGY
29See7e.g., Moscovici & Doise, Decbion Making in Groups7 in SOCIAL
CLASSIC
AND CONTEMPORARY
INTEGRATIONS
230-88. (Nemeth ed. 1974).
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uak3O There is a host of both obvious and subtle influences that can
work in group settings to move the consensus or final decision away
from the decision that would be predicted on the basis of the predeliberation decisions of all the individuals involved. For example, in
a very recent study designed to assess the influence of sexism on jury
deliberations, we found that the predeliberation verdicts of groups of
mock jurors did not vary as a function of the sex of the defense
attorney in a simulated murder trial.31 However, during jury deliberations, issues arose which led to the rendition of significantly more
guilty verdicts by juries exposed to a female defense attorney than
by juries exposed to a male defense attorney. For present purposes,
the point to be made is that legally significant changes can occur in
individual decisions as a result of jury deliberations.
The most conservative assumptions under these circumstances are
that the existence of differential media effects, measured in jurors,
predict effects that would occur in juries, but that the absence of
effects measured in jurors does not predict their absence in juries.
Adoption of these assumptions in the present circumstance would
force those who argue for a lack of practical difference between live
and videotape presentations to prove their point by studying group
deliberations. However, this approach is probably unrealistically
pristine. The final section of the critique readdresses this issue in the
context of policy recommendations.

2. The use of actual jurors
A second, briefer methodological point common to both studies
concerns the experimental participants. Both the MSU and the BYU
groups went to considerable lengths to maximize the validity of their
findings by choosing research participants who were as much under
the contextual sway of the courts as possible at the time of their
participation. The cooperation of the Flint, Michigan, court in the
initial Nugent v. Clark experiment is certainly t o be applauded, as is
the cooperation afforded the BYU team by the 4th Judicial District
Court of Utah.32 The importance of basing conclusions about the
aOResearch in this area was undertaken in order to comprehend the dynamics of
what was claimed to be a decisional conservatism induced by group pressure on corporate boards of directors. Research revealed that for certain kinds of decisions, group
influences led to the assumption of higher degrees of risk than would be predicted
knowing the predeliberation preferencg of the individuals. Subsequent research led
to the more general hypothesis that the decisional shift induced by group processes
was importantly related to the nature of the material under consideration. For a
critical review of the relevant literature, see Cartwright, Determinants of Scientzjic
Progress - The Case of Research on the Risky Shift, 28 AM.PSYCH.
222 (1973).
S1Bermant & McGuire, Effects of Sex of Attorney and Race of ~ e f i n d a n ton Jury
Verdicts in a Simulated Murder Trial (manuscript currently in preparation).
32There is, however, a disquieting feature of the initial MSU study that should not go
unnoticed. The research participants were intentionally misled by the court during
the conduct of the research. Of course, the rationale for the deception is clear enough,
and the participants were subsequently debriefed concerning the true nature of the
enterprise. Nevertheless, we need to question the advisability of trading, even slightly,
the rule of honesty in the court against the need for experimental verisimilitude. This
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behavior of jurors and juries on experiments involving actual jurors
cannot be overemphasized. In general, one's confidence in the validity of the reported findings varies substantially with the authenticity
of the participant population. If currently serving jurors are recruited
as research participants, then at least one does not have t o evaluate
the likelihood that the observed results will generalize to the population of practical interest, for the jurors are that population.

3. Media effects o n the judgment of jurors
Finally, the following basic point about the results of both studies
needs to be emphasized: neither the MSU nor the BYU study has
demonstrated that the medium of trial presentation has a statistically
significant effect on the primary legal judgment of jurors.33 Thus any
disagreements between the two groups about the advisability of
wide-scale videotape implementation, or the most desirable form
thereof, are based on different interpretations of the influence of
rather general psychological processes on primary legal judgments. As
already mentioned, there exists no substantive theory for the unequivocal prediction of differential legal judgments as a function of
variation in these psychological processes. Hence, at this stage, disagreements between the two groups are best construed as disagreements in trans-scientific j ~ d g m e n t . 3 ~
In turning now to a somewhat more detailed analysis of the
separate reports, the critique will attempt to treat purely behavioral
or technical matters only to the extent that they bear on legally
relevant conclusions.

B. The MSU Experiments
I . Critique o f the Nugent v. Clark studies
The Nugent v. Clark dramatization is the most complex and realistic trial simulation yet accomplished. The investigators were extremely sensitive to the demands of structural verisimilitude in
simulation; the research sets a new standard for this
HOWever, by following good experimental design principles and creating a
videotape trial as similar to the live trial as technically possible, the
investigators created a document different in many important par-

is a very serious question that should be debated by forums of jurists and behavioral
scientists.
33By the term "primary legal judgment," I mean assessment of negligence, guilt, size
of appropriate award, etc., in other words, the class of judgments jurors are in fact
called upon to make for legal purposes.
W e i n b e r g , Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA
209 (1972), provides a lucid
exposition of the distinction between scientific and trans-scientific issues. Some important questions can be asked but not answered in the language of science. It is at
this point that adversarial processes become most useful.
S5The concepts of structural and functional verisimilitude in trial simulation are
spelled out in Bermant, McGuire, McKinley & Salo, The Lo@c of Simulation in Jury
Research, 1 CRIM.JUSTICE& BEHAVIOR
224 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bermant,
McGuire, McKinley & Salo] .
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ticulars from a PRVTT. For example, a PRVTT as generally envisioned is composed of a series of segments-testimony of different
witnesses recorded at different times and places. Thus a PRVTT
necessarily lacks the continuity and perhaps cohesiveness which inheres in a live trial by reason of its presentation at one time in one
place. It is of course unfair to criticize the MSU study for not doing
what it did not set out to do; such criticism is not the intention here.
The intention is rather to reemphasize the unique and basically openended characteristics of PRVTT that need t o be examined in order to
assess their behavioral impact. Thus, while the first MSU experiment
was well designed and conducted, its negative results do not provide
the kind of assurance we should like to have. When the authors
conclude, "On the basis of this study and the impressions we gleaned
while conducting the research, we find the videotaped trial format not
guilty of any of the charges of detrimental effects on jury res p o n s e ~ , "they
~ ~ are speaking about a videotape trial format which
is unlikely to be definitive of the model PRVTT of the future.
Nugent v. Clark Study 2, contrasting full-screen with split-screen
videotape, landed one of the curious fish alluded to in the introduction. A statistically significant change was found in estimates of the
credibility of one of the attorneys, Mr. Simmons. Faced with the
finding, the investigators attempt to interpret it. The interpretation is
fundamentally ad hoc. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, if the
finding be taken seriously37 it suggests that changes within the video
medium can be more influential in determining certain aspects of
juror behavior than are changes between live and video conditions.
This interpretation highlights the need for explicit guidelines on
videotape formats and makes the "live v. videotape" question seem
less pressing.
The Nugent v. Clark Studies 3 and 4, dealing with the effects of
deleting inadmissible testimony, are particularly interesting given the
value placed on this feature of PRVTT by the video medium's adv o c a t e ~ .The
~ ~ deletion of inadmissible testimony has been held as
the major legal advantage of videotaped testimony. If, over a reasonably wide range of deletions, no appreciable changes in juror behavior can be found, then one of the major presumptive reasons for
change loses some of its force. How much force it loses is a question
of policy, not of science.

2. Critique o f the information retention studies
The second section of the MSU study, dealing with information
retention under live, color video, and black-and-white video condi-

S6Millersection 11, B, 4.
37It is in the nature of the statistical tests employed that statistically significant findings will appear accidentally at a rate directly related to the criterion point for defining
significance. Thus, if the Miller group claims as significant results with a significance
level of .05, then they are running a 5 in 100 chance of making a mistake about the
nonrandom character of every significant difference they report. The more comparisons
they make, the more likely they are to report false significances.
38See,e.g., McCrystal, s u p a note 7.
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tions, presents both behavioral scientist and lawyer with some formidable problems of interpretation. So many possibly differentiating
variables were introduced between the first and second experiments
of the session that it becomes difficult to determine with precision
which of the several effects reported are to be considered practically
significant. There was a provocative finding in the first experiment of
the section that was not followed up, namely a faster decline, absolutely slight but relatively stable, in information retention in live as
opposed to videotape conditions. No matter how small the magnitude of the effect (and it appears to be very small indeed), it would
be worthwhile to know if it is replicable. A simple replication experiment to pin down the effect more securely would have been welcome. But instead we are left with the finding flopping around on
the bottom of our intellectual boat, while the investigators move on
to Study 2 in which almost every relevant variable has been changed.
Study 2 in this series provides information about estimates of
witness credibility as well as information retention scores. For this
experiment the information retention scores are not broken down
over time so that the declining retention scores discovered in Study 1
could not be checked for replicability. Indeed, Study 2 is inttoduced
as if Study 1 had shown reliably greater information retention for
videotape than for live presentations. But that assertion is an overinterpretation of the experimental results. The observed significant
interaction may have been due as much to higher retention of information during the first 13 minutes of the live presentation as to
lower retention scores for the last 13 minutes. An overall information retention advantage for videotape cannot be asserted on the
basis of the significant interaction between information retention
and medium of presentation, over time, in the absence of a significant main effect for medium of presentation. Only a careful replication and extension of Study 1 can clarify this issue.
The observed interaction between apparent confidence of the
witness and mode of video presentation in the determination of witness credibility scores is psychologically interesting, but its place in
policy discussions about videotape implementation is unclear. However, the discussion of the "modal" personality is of practical interest. In the State of Washington, for example, there is a class of
Superior Court trials in which all the testimony is read to the jury by
c0unsel.~9Thus the entire trial is conducted through the mediation
of a "modal" witness. The results presented here, as well as the
discussion of read transcript material in the BYU study, could be
used to make an effective argument that the reading of the transcript
39These are workmen's compensation cases in which the plaintiff, dissatisfied after a
series of increasingly elaborate administrative procedures, takes the state's Department
of Labor and Industries (DLI) to court. Plaintiffs counsel and the state's attorney
cooperate in reading the testimony from the final administrative hearing to the jury;
no new evidence is presented. A sample of 128 of these cases formed the basis for the
empirical study of the effects of jury size on trial outcome reported in Bermant &
Coppock, supra note 6.
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should be replaced by the display of a videotape of the administrative hearing on which the transcript is based.
The findings of Study 3, in which the modal witness condition was
dropped and an extended information retention test was administered for both black-and-white and color videotape, provide the basis
for the MSU group's final recommendation that the less costly blackand-white format could be the medium of practical choice. These
findings will be discussed later in a direct comparison with the findings and conclusions of the BYU group.

3. Critique of the emotional arousal studies
The application of galvanic skin response measurements to the
black-and-white v. color videotape question raises so many psychophysiological and psychological issues that much more space would
be required for adequate exposition than the results warrant. Even
granting without analysis the authors' conclusion that black-andwhite videotape produces greater emotional arousal than color videotape, there is no way to determine how that difference in arousal
level would be influential in altering the practical reasoning jurors are
called upon to perform.40
C. The BYU Experiment
The material on which the BYU trial simulation was based was a
straightforward land condemnation action involving one witness on
either side of the suit. The question at issue was technical and, it
seems fair to say, relatively dull given a juror's expectation for the
kinds of material that might be presented in court. In fact, the ordinariness of the case material recommends it as the basis for simulation, for it is just such cases that can benefit from the timesaving and
other administrative advantages claimed for PRVTT. Unfortunately,
as the BYU authors emphasize, the strength in the case was primarily
on one side, perhaps thereby preventing differences due to medium
of presentation to be expressed freely.
The BYU investigators subjected their data to a complex process
of statistical manipulations. Figures 1 through 7 of the BYU paper
represent high-order abstractions from the original raw data provided
by the mock jurors. One needs to consider the extent to which these
numbers and the labels associated with them are accurate reflections
of psychological realities with policy implications.
To understand what is at issue, consider Appendix 2 of the BYU
article, in which are listed factor names associated with sets of pairs
of polar adjectives. While there is a certain intuitive reasonableness in
the groupings under the several labels, intuition was not the basis for
the groupings nor should it be trusted on its own. The polar adjective
40For one account of the likely realities of behavior in a jury room, see H. GARFINKEL,
IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY
104-15 (1967). For an overview of the galvanic skin
STUDIES
response literature, see W. PROKASY
& D. RASKIN,ELECTRODERMAL
ACTIVITYIN
PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESEARCH
(1975).
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pairs are listed together because of their relative affinity in a multidimensional space constructed out of a technique called factor analysis. What the technique does is to go repeatedly through the matrix
of intercorrelations between polar adjective pairs and extract information (variance) from it in regard to which polar adjective pairs are
related to each other. The results of the process are several sets of
numbers. Each set is called a factor. The number in each set, one for
every polar adjective pair, are the strengths or loadings of that polar
adjective pair on that factor. The technique is intentionally constructed to insure that the various factors are uncorrelated (orthogonal); it is a mathematical Procrustean bed.41
Faced with sets of orthogonal factor loadings, the investigator
undertakes difficult interpretive tasks. Each factor must be interpreted for its psychological significance, but there are no guarantees
that such significance will be present. The results of interpretation
are the factor labels. In the current instance, these are competency,
honesty, friendliness, appearance, and objectivity. Factor labeling is a
matter of art, and it is an open question whether the labels are
properly denotative of psychological reality. Moreover, a judgment
needs to be made before the labeled factor is brought to the discussion of the substantive problem under consideration. That judgment
is based on the amount of information (variance) about the original
correlation matrix brought together (accounted for) by each of the
factors. It is in the nature of the technique that each successive
factor brings together less information. Eventually the meaningfulness of the original matrix is exhausted, and the technique simply
reiterates through the random remainders. The hazard facing the
investigator at this point is overinterpretation of the matrix: a factor
will be labeled that deserves no label. Again, this is a matter of art
and judgment. But as a rule of thumb, it has been suggested that
factors with eigenvalues less than 1.0 ought not to be i n t e r ~ r e t e d . ~ ~
Given this background, how are the BYU factors to be evaluated
in regard to their usefulness for making intermedium comparisons?
All the factors are, by the eigenvalue rule, technically interpretable.
However, in my opinion, the interpretations of appearance,
o b jectivity , and handsomeness-calmness are stretched beyond
the likely significance of the findings. Although technically proper,
the analyses seem psychologically overextended.
It is interesting to compare the BYU findings for competency and
honesty with the IUSU findings on witness credibility from Study 3
of the information retention studies. If these various labels be taken
as valid denoters of psychological constructs, then it is reasonable to
41For a useful source of technical information, consult H. HARMAN,
MODERN
FACTOR
(2d ed. 1967). Factor analysis was originally used in psychology in respect
ANALYSIS
to studies of intelligence, and has subsequently found favor in several research areas.
Unfortunately, i t is also often used in attempts to create order out of chaos algorithmically; the attempts seldom succeed,
42Zd.I thank Professor Allen Edwards, Dr. Carl Bennett, and Dr. Michael Lindell for
advice on this point.
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equate credibility with competency and honesty. MSU found
that estimates of witness credibility were lower for black-and-white
than for color videotape. However, BYU did not find lower competency or honesty ratings for the monochromatic medium. The lack
of congruence on this issue highlights one of the difficulties of
comparing research results from different laboratories when there are
no agreed upon standards and dimensions of measurement. The
critique returns to this point later with the recommendation that
greater effort be exerted to standardize methods in this area of research.
Parts B through E of section I11 (the research results) of the BYU
article present a welter of analyses that are difficult to place together
in a coherent framework. Take for example two questions of general
policy relevance: (1)Are there reasons in these data t o suggest a slow
down or prohibition of the use of PRVTT? (2) Are there reasons to
prefer color videotape to black-and-white? A comparison of the
answers to the two questions supplied by the separate analyses of
data appears in the table below.
Analysis

Live v. Video

I Black-and-white v. Color

Landowner compensation (absolute
amounts and distributions)

No significant difference reported

No significant difference
reported

Dollar awards x juror
ratings

Landowner predicts
outcome in video,
expert in live

No significant difference
reported

Preferences for trial
participants

Live differs from black- No significant difference
reported
and-white, not from
color

Juror reactions to
trials

Live differs from color
in ease of attention,
not at all from
black-and-white

No significant difference
reported

One of the observed differences between live and videotape
presentations-in the relationship of the dollar awards to juror ratings
of trial participants-must be interpreted in light of the particular
circumstances of this trial. The other two differences, in which the
live presentation produced different outcomes from one of the videotape presentations (color or black-and-white) but not the other, are
difficult to interpret because the two videotape presentations are not
reported to be different. Thus, the data are equivocal on the major
policy issues. There are, however, other relevant issues addressed by
the data. In particular, the study provides good reasons for replacing
I
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the reading of transcripts by audio or video communication whenever possible.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
First, in regard to the general policy of videotape implementation:
there are not sufficient grounds in any of the studies reported to
warrant holding back careful, on-site evaluation of PRVTT in a wide
variety of cases and settings. This conclusion is not in disagreement
with our earlier conclusion that other considerations may warrant a
conservative time table for the increased utilization of PRVTT.43
While the BYU investigators may be correct in their concern about
videotape implementation, their data do not, in my opinion, support
their concern.
This conclusion does not imply that no additional research on
PRVTT or partial videotape uses is required, but rather that the
research be extended to include actual trials. We need a carefully
designed evaluation of videotape usage in courts of sufficient case
volume that random assignment of cases to videotape or live presentation would, in a brief period, generate a sufficient data base. There
are probably numerous legal and administrative issues to be addressed and resolved before this program of evaluation could be
undertaken. All concerned parties should participate in the development of the evaluation program. Conclusions from standard research
methodologies need to be supplemented with the seasoned opinions
of judges, lawyers, court reporters, and administrators. Bringing an
increased technological load into the courtrosm process may alienate
some. Any possible alienating effects could be reduced, however, by
soliciting the active assistance of all who will be affected by the
innovation in constructing details of its operation.
Second, in regard to the black-and-white v. color videotape question: the data presented by the MSU and BYU groups suggest that
the decision need not be forced by first-order psychological considerations. In my opinion, concern about biasing effects of black-andwhite videotape is not supported by the data presented in the symposium. This does not mean, however, that courts should opt for
black-and-white video on the grounds of short-run economy. Whatever the case be now, there is little doubt that in a relatively few
years black-and-white videotape will have all but disappeared from
American life. The greater cost of color videotape equipment at
present needs to be weighed against its eventual ubiquity.
Third, experimental research of the sort presented in the symposium should be continued with greater standardization of materials
and methods. There is great scientific value in straightforward replication of experiments in different laboratories. Scientific understanding of media effects on legal decision making will grow more rapidly

43Bermant & Jacoubovitch, supra note 4.
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and surely if investigators can agree in advance on the materials and
measuring instruments they will use.
Fourth, there is a need for sound testable theory relating the
rational processes of legal decision making to the nonrational effects
of changes in media of communication. As a minor contribution to
such theoretical development, the following hypothesis is offered for
experimental test: the more evenly balanced or ambiguous the legal
issues on the two sides of a case, the more influential will be the
extralegal factors in the case, including the medium through which
the case is presented t o the jury. This simple idea, if properly refined
and operationalized, could serve as the theoretical foundation for a
number of interesting and practical experiments.
The offered hypothesis will perhaps render an additional service.
The attempted operationalization of the concept "even balance" in
regard to the legal issues in a case should provide the beginning of the
kind of normative theory of legal decision making that is required in
order to properly evaluate the influence of technological changes in
courtroom practice. The pioneering work of Kalven and Zeisel in
comparing decisions of judges and juries is an example of the kind of
data base reauired to develox, the relevant normative the or^.^^ Cases
of varying degrees of balance could be devised by reference to the
evaluations of expert panels on the appropriateness of decisions
made by juries in large numbers of cases.45 Alternatively, simulated
cases could be created wherein the degrees of legal balance or ambiguity were systematically varied.46 In either case, trials of the cases
could be presented through different media, and the impact of the
medium on trial outcome could be determined. Other extralegal factors could be investigated in the same experiments, in much the same
way as has already been done by the MSU and BYU groups. The
advantage of the method suggested here is that one would have some
idea about how the results ought to turn out because one would then
have some standards of justice and equity against which to measure
results. This calibrating procedure would be of substantial value in
moving the issue of videotape trials from the abstractions of laboratory research to the concrete realities of courtroom technology.
1

I

J

44H.KALVEN
& H. ZEISEL,
THEAMERICAN
JURY
(1966).
45This procedure would expand the concept of functional verisimilitude of trial
simulation as described by Bermant, McGuire, McKinley & Salo, supra note 35.
46Consider for example the typical automobile-accident-at-an-intersectioncase wherein
both parties claim to have had the green light. Over a large number of such cases juries
find for the plaintiff approximately half the time, i.e., as if flipping a coin. JURY
VERDICT
RESEARCH
INC.,3 PERSONAL
INJURY
VALUATION
HANDBOOKS,
LIABILITY
RECOVERY
PROBABILITIES
26a-27 (1970). It may be conjectured that when a decision hinges on who
is telling the truth and who is lying, one expects extralegal factors to be maximally
effective in determining outcomes. Apparently the case presented by the BYU group
represents a substantially greater degree of imbalance.

